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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CLARENCE 'VOODARD and
INNA WOODARD,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

CASE NO. 8031

JESSE R. ALLEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts as set forth in the appellant's
brief is substantially correct, but the respondent desires
to call particular attention to some matters of evidence.
Fred Gagan, the appellant's real estate agent, represented to Mr. Allen that in the event of a sale the
vVoodards would get into their car and drive off, meaning that every thing except personal belongings and the
automobile would go with the same. However, Mr. Woodard reserved a hay baler (Tr. 50-51). Mr. Gagan, in
effect, made the same statement to Mr. Allen and Mr.
Hall before the con tract was signed. Mr. Hall testified
that Mr. Gagan stated that "Everything goes," except
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a hay haler and some hand tools (Tr. 76). Mr. Allen
tm;tified that when the contract was signed Mr. Gagan,
referring to the li'St of personal property made a part
of the contract of sale, said:.
''This just lists the principal part of the machinery, but everything goes" (Tr. 53).
Instead of all the personal property except person£tl
belongings, the automobile, the hay baler and hand tools
going with the deal, it subsequently developed that at
least the following were either to be retained by Mr.
'Voodard or did not belong to him:
A two-wheel trailer and cutter (Tr. 55),
Cement mixer, leveler and hayrack (Tr. 56),
.:\Iilking machine and scales ( Tr. 74).
Hay and grain (Tr. 78).
The farm was represented by Mr. Gagan to Mr.
Allen as containing 170 acres of land under cultivation
(Tr. 18, 20, 21, 2:2, 23, 24, 42, 43, 51, 57, 58, 77). There
were only 108 acres of land under cultivation (Tr. 57).
Mr. Woodard and ~Ir. Allen canceled and rescinded
the contract (Tr. 58, 59, 89, 90, 92). After :Mr. Woodard
and :Mr. Allen rescinded the contract Mr. Woodard
solicited Mr. Hall to find a purchaser for the property
(Tr. 59), and Mr. Hall thereafter, at Mr. Woodard's
request, attempted to interest two prospective buyers
in the property (Tr. 79, 80). :Mr. Rawlings and his
brother were taken to the property by Ira Gagan, who
attempted to sell· the property to them. Mr. Woodard
participated in the conversations at the Woodard farm
with Mr. Rawlings, his brother and Ira Gagan (Tr. 83,
84, 87, 88).
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The representations concerning the amount of land
under cultivation and the real property to be sold were
largely Inade by Fred Gagan, 'Yoodards' real estate
agent, and not by :Jh;._ "~ oodard (Tr. 74). However, Mr.
Allen discussed the matter with Mr. Woodard, who confirmed the representations n1ade by Gagan (Tr. 74).
The appellant has chosen to argue his case under
three points:
1. That the evidence and testiinony received was
insufficient to justify the decree rendered.
2. The decision of the trial Court was contrary
to law and the rulef? of equity.
3. That the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
The third point is covered by the first two and will
not require separate treatment.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
The re·spondent will present his case under two
points:
1. The evidence was sufficient to justify the
decree rendered.
2. The decree of the trial Court was not contrary
to law and is the correct decision under the
rules of equity.
In addition, the respondent asserts that the Court
was in error in failing to find in respondent's favor in
the following particulars :
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STATI~l\1:ENT

OF CROSS ERRORS

3. That the trial Court was in error in failing to
make findings in favor of the respondent upon the allegation or the defendant's answer that the plaintiff represented to the defendant or that the respondent believed
that the farm contained 170 acres of cultivated land
instead of 108 acres and in failing to find that the personal property repre~ented to be included in the transaction was not all included therein and in failing to make
and enter conclusions of law and decree in favor of the
defendant in the exercise of a sound discretion because
of such representations.
ARGU~lENT

POINT

O~E

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE
DECREE RENDERED.

When the case was first called for trial the defendant
was granted leave of Court to amend the defendant's
answer to set up as an affirmative defense that the plaintiffs are not the owners of a marketable title to the
premises involved in this action. Thereupon the plaintiffs
moved that the trial be continued to allow them time to
meet the matter set up in the said affirmative defense.
At that time the plaintiffs were informed that the
defendant relied upon the fact that the title to the
plaintiffs' property came through tax titles, which are not
marketable. The Court granted the motion to continue and
the case subsequently came on for trial. Plaintiffs offered
in evidence the abstract of title to the premises to be
sold and the files of the District Court of Duchesne
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County, CiYil Nluubers 1974, 1975, 1976 and 2017. These
files were actions to quiet title upon the tax deeds in
the chain of title. At the tin1e the files were introduced
the Court asked if there was any objection to their introduction and the defendant'~ counsel ,stated that he would
check the files to determine whether or not the affidavits
in support of the orders of publication of summons
were sufficient and for any other matters which would
affect the sufficiency of the actions. After the case was
submitted the trial Court asked for briefs on the matter
and the question of the sufficiency of the affidavits ia
support of the orders of publication of summons was
discussed therein.
Appellant contends that the Court made no specific
findings as to any defect in plaintiffs' chain of title.
The Court found that in the chain of title to several
parcels totaling 240 acres of plaintiffs' lands and forming necessary links in the chain of title to each parcel
was a tax deed and that the actions to quiet title upon said
tax deeds, files numbers 1974, 1975 and 1976 were
ineffective. Appellant also contends that the abstract
of title introduced by plaintiffs shows a fee simple title
in Clarence Woodard with no defects or omissions in the
chain of title. Files numbers 1974, 1975, 1976 and 2017
were introduced by plaintiffs to establish that quiet
title actions had been brought on the tax deeds in the
chains of title. Appellant impliedly admitted by the
introduction of said files that his title, without said
suits to quiet title, is not marketable-else why did he
introduce said files~
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An examination of these files will dif.;close that under
the ruling of this Court in the recent case of Bowen v.
Olson, ____________ Utah ____________ ; 246 Pac. (2d) 602, the affidavits for publication of summons are wholly insufficient
to give the Court jurisdiction of the defendants in those
actions. For example, in ease number 1974 the only allegation as to diligence used in locating Jesse E. Tripp and
Mrs. Jesse E. Tripp, two defendants in that action, is
as follows:
"That the defendants Jesse E. Tripp and Mrs.
Jesse E. Tripp, his wife, cannot be found within
the State of Utah; and so far as is known by
plaintiff they have moYed from said State; that
they cannot, after due diligence, be found within
said State of Utah. That plaintiff has used due
diligence in trying to locate said defendants but
has failed to locate their address or whereabouts.''
The affidavit in case number 1975 is no better and
is practically a repetition of the allegation just quoted.
The affidavit in case Number 1976 is practically the
same.
In the case of Bowen v. Olson, supra, much more
material of an evidentiary nature was set forth in the
affidavit in support of publication of summons than in
said cases, files numbers 1974, 1975 and 1976. In that
case the Court held that where the affidavit in support
of the order of publication of summons does not contain
sufficient facts from which a judge or clerk could satisfy
himself that the requirements of the statute as to diligence in ascertaining the place of residence of the de-
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fendants had been n1et, the publication did not effect a
service on the defendant and the judgment was void on
its face for lack of jurisdiction. As Justice Wade, in
writing the main opinion in Bowen v. Olson, said:
·'It is a basic rule that judgment is void and
subject to collateral :attack if a lack of jurisdi0tion in the Court appears on the face of the
record. • "' *.
•' The affidavit for publication having failed to
reveal any facts at all from which a judge or
clerk could satisfy himself that the requirements
of the statute had been met, the publication did
not effect service on the appellant and the judgment was void on its face for lack of jurisdiction
in the Court.''
A title to real property which must depend upon a
tax deed is not marketable because examining attorneys
will not accept such. The actions to quiet title upon
the tax deeds being void, the Court properly found that
plaintiff,s' title to the parcels covered by the aforesaid
actions was not marketable. There is ample evidence in
the exhibits introduced by the appellant to support the
finding that plaintiffs' title to a portion of the real
property was not marketable.
Appellants further argue that" the abstract of title
discloses they have held title and possession for over
seven years, peaceably and quietly and without threat of
litigation. The abstract does not disclose such facts. If
such facts exist they are matters to be proved. They do
not appear in the abstract. Only litigation can establish
the truth or falsity of such allegations. And thus the
title is not marketable.
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As the Court said in Winston v. Gilstrap, 147 Or.
374; 32 Pac. (2d) 769:
"As said in Lockhart v. Ferrey, supra, at page
183 of 59 Or. 115, 115 Pac. 431, 433 a "marketable title" means one appearing 'to be such by
the record of conveyances or other public
memorial. It means that the title must appear
of record, and not rest in parol.''
In the case of Stewart-Livestock Company v. Ostler,
105 Utah 529; 144 Pac. (2d) ~76 this Court said:
''The allegation that Ostler might have acquired
title by adverse possession by paying taxes for
seven consecutive years is not a defense to the
plea of breach of contract of sale, for title
acquired by adverse possession through acts of
the grantee is not a defense to the plea of
breach of contract of sale, for title acquired by
adverse possession through acts of the grantee
is not a compliance on the part of a grantor with
a covenant to 'perfect the title.' Furthermore,
the mere fact that the grantee might actually
prevail in litigation against any other person
would not satisfy the requirement that the
grantor convey a ma:rketable title.''
The covenant to convey title by statutory form of
"·arrant deed amounts to a covenant to give "a good
and sufficient deed," which necessarily implies that title
shall be marketable.
In the case at bar the contract provides that the
plaintiffs will execute and deliver to the buyers or assigns
a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title
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to the above described premises free and clear of all
encumbrances, so that in this case the plaintiffs warrant
a marketable title.
In the case of otewart Livestock Company v. Ostler,
supra, the Court said:
"The covenant to convey title by statutory form
of warranty deed amounts to a covenant to give
•a good and sufficient title', which necessarily
implies the title shall be marketable.''
Upon the question of what constitutes marketability,
the Court, in the case of Aye~rs v. Graff, 153 Kan. 209;
109 Pac. (2d) 202, ·states the rule as follows:
"The title to realty need not be bad in fact to
render it 'nonmerchantable', but it is sufficient
if an ordinarily prudent man with knowledge
of facts and aware of legal questions involved
would not accept it in ordinary course of business.''
Title to real property is unmarketable if it is dependent upon judicial proceedings which are jurisdictionally
defective. 57 A.L.R. 1460 citing Re Safe Deposit & Trust
Company, 125 ~r[d. 519, 94 Atl. 93,
"holding that a title is not marketable where it
is dependent upon a deed issued in a proceeding
for collection of a delinquent tax and the
statutory requirement that notice of sale shall
be served upon the owners has not been complied with.''
The Court said in the case of Ca.p.arell v. G'ood'body,
132 N. J. Eq. 559; 29 Atl. (2d) 563, 574:
''As early as 1874 our Chancellor conformally
stated: 'The Court will never compel a pur-
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chaser to take a title where the point on which
it depends is too doubtful to be settled without
litigation, or where the purchase would expose
him to the hazard of such proceedings; or, as
it is usually expressed, it will not compel him to
buy a law suit. That may be a good title at law
which a court of equity in the exercise of its
discretionary power, will not force on an unwilling purchaser. Every purchaser of land has a
right to demand a title which shall put him
in all reasonable security, and which shall protect him from anxiety, lest annoying, if not successful, suits be brought against him and probably take from him or his representatives, land
upon which money is invested. He should have
a title which shall enable him not only to hold
his land, but to hold it in peace; and if he wishes
to sell it, to be reasonably sure that no flaw or
doubt will come up to disturb its marketable
value.''

POINT TWO
THE DECREE OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW AND IS THE CORRECT DECISION UNDER
THE RULES OF EQUITY.

Appellants complain that they should have been
allowed to clear the title if the defects were of such a
nature that they could be cleared and cite the case of
Sabin v~Rauch, 75 Ariz. 275; 255 Pac. (2d) 206 to support
this point. There is considerable law upon this point.
But an examination of the cases will disclose that almost
invariably the purchaser has been in possession of the
property when the Court has allowed the seller time
within which to quiet title to his lands. In the case of
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Sabin Y. Rauch, supra, the purchaser was in possession.
In this ea~e the respondent has never been in possession
of the lands.

The matter of allowing the vendor to perfect his
title is discussed in 49 Am. J ur. Sec. 103, Page 121. Following is the text:
· •Subsequent Perfection of Vendor's Title; Allowance of Reasonable time to Perfect. One who
contracts to convey an estate which he does not
own at the time, may, if he afterward becomes
the owner, be compelled to perform the contract
and convey the land ; and on the other hand,
the vendor may, if able to make good title at
the time stipulated, compel specific performance
by the purchaser and recover the agreed consideration. Where time is not of the essence of
a contract for the sale of land, a decree of specific performance will be rendered altho the title
was not perfected at the time the contract of
sale was made or at the time of the suit for
specific performance was filed, if it appears that
the title is perfected at the time the decree is
rendered. If the vendor is unable to make
good title at the time stipulated or at the time
of trial, it is within the discretion of the Court
to allow the vendor a reasonable time to perfect
his title and compel the purchaser to accept it,
providing time is not of the essence of the contract and it can be done without hardship or
injustice to the vendee. This rule applies
especially where the vendee entered into the
contract knowing of the vendor's title * * * "'.
Usually in order to secure additional time for
perfecting his title, the vendor must ask the
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court for such favor; ordinarily it will not be
granted where he goes to trial asserting good
title which is denied by the defendant. The fact
that the vendor did not have good and merchantable title at the time the contract of sale was
executed, and doe~ not have such title at the
time the ~mit for specific performance is instituted will, however, along with other circumstances, sometimes cause a court to refuse to
grant specific performance.''
In this case the respondent did not know of the
defects in the appellants' title at the time the contract was
executed. The appellant~ did not ask the Court for additional time within which to perfect their title. The
appellants went to trial, as~-;erting good title, which was
denied by the respondent. The trial Court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, properly ruled in favor of the
respondent.
The following from 55 Am. Jur. Sec. 281, page 725,
is in point on the matter of the possession of the property:
"Many of the ca·ses which have held that a vendee
cannot, prior to the time set for conveyance,
complain of defects in the vendor's title, have
predicated that ruling in part upon the circumstance of the vendee's being in possession of the
premises.
The appellant:-:; complain that they should have been
permitted to furnish a policy of title insurance in lieu
of a marketable title and quote a provision of the contract
(page 25 of appellants' brief) to the effect that the ·sellers
may furnish an abstract of title or policy of title insur-
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anc.e. The appellants did not tender a title insurance
policy. HoweYer, the appellants are in error in their
position that the respondent contracted to accept a title
policy in lieu of a marketable title. A careful reading
of the provisions of the contract as set forth at page 25
of the ~\.ppellants' Brief will disclose that the sellers
agreed to deliver a good and sufficient warranty deed,
which, as heretofore discussed, implies a marketable-title.
In addition, the sellers agreed to either furnish an
abstract of title or a policy of title insurance. There is
nothing in the contract which states that the buyer shall
accept a policy of title insurance in lieu of a marketable
title. It only provides that the sellers may furnish a
policy of title insurance in lieu of an abstract.
As di,scussed at length hereinafter, the matter of
decreeing specific performance of a contract is largely
a matter of discretion in the trial Court. Under the facts
and law as hereinbefore set forth, the trial Court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to decree ,specific
performance of the eon tract in this ease.

POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FAILING TO
MAKE FINDINGS IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT UPON
THE ALLEGATION OF THE RESPONDENT'S ANSWER
THAT THE APPELLANTS REPRESENTED TO THE RESPONDENT THAT THE FARM CONTAINED 170 ACRES
OF CULTIVATED LAND INSTEAD OF 108 ACRES AND IN
FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PERSONAL PROPERTY
REPRESENTED TO BE INCLUDED IN THE TRANSACTION
WAS NOT ALL INCLUDED THEREIN AND IN FAILING
TO MAKE AND ENTER CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND A
DECREE IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT IN THE EXERCISE OF SOUND DISCRETION BECAUSE OF SUCH
REPRESENTATIONS.
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A~ shown by the evidence set forth under the statement ol' l'ad~ in thi~s brief, Fred Gagan represented that
all pP r~onal property except hand tools, a hay baler, and
plaintil'l':-~' JH·rslmal effects would go to the purchaser
and that tlt<~n~ \\'ere 170 acres of land under cultivation.
Relying upon the:-~1· representations, Mr. Allen executed
the agreement to purchase. He expected to receive onefourth of the oil rights, all of the personal property upon
the farn1 except hand tools, a hay baler, plaintiffs' personal effects and his automobile, and a farm containing
170 acres under cultivation. As he testified, he would not
have entered into the contract if he had known that
there were only 108 acres under cultivation (Tr. 59).

It matters not that the mi~stake as to the amount
of land under cultivation or the amount of personal
property involved in the tranaction was induced by Mr.
Gagan rather than by the plaintiff himself. The fact
that the contract as written, if specifically enforced,
would not give to ~fr. Allen what he thought he was
buying would make it inequitable to enforce the contract.
There is also anoher n1atter. Under the contract Mt.
Allen was to receive one-fourth of the oil rights in the
391 acres. Although this fact does not appear in the
abstract (plaintiffs' Exhibit "D"), Mr. Allen has a
letter from the abstracter to the effect that there is
an error in the abstract and particularly at Entry 12
thereof. Entry 12 should show that the Government
reserved all oil rights in and to the 160 acres described
therein. The fact that Mr. Woodard knows that he does
not own these oil rights is inferentially shown at Entry
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80, an oil and gas lease from the \V oodards to Carter
Oil Company of all their lands except this 160 acres.
Also, as shown on Entry 78 of Exhibit "D,'' the Woodards g·ave a mineral deed to Paul E. Nelson for an
undivided interest in and to the rest of the lands owned
by the """ oodards, but particularly omitting the 160
acres mentioned in Entry 12.
So that the Court is not only justified in refusing
specific perfonnance as a nmtter of discretion, but
should, as a matter of right to the defendant, refuse
specific performance where the number of acres under
cultivation, the amount of personal property, marketability of the title and the amount of oil rights stand as
they do in this case.
The matter of decreeing specific perfo1mance of a
contract is largely a matter of discretion in the trial
Court. The rule is stated and annotated with numerous
cases in 81 C.J.S., Sec. 9, page 417, as follows:
''Discretion of Court. a. In General. As a general rule, the specific performance of a contract by a court of equity is not a matter of
absolute right in the parties demanding it, ·but
the grant of specific performance is a matter
of grace, and applications for such relief :are
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.
The grant of specific performance is a matter
for the Court's discretion and not of right,
although a legal contract is shown to exist, the
terms of which are clear, certain and unambiguous even where the contract was entered into
' and honestly without the presence of
fairly
fraud. It has been held that the remedy is dis-
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cretionary even with respect to contracts in
which the remedy is ordinarily invoked, and
even though a legal right to damages for a
breach of contract may exist.
''b. Limitation on Discretion. Under the general
rule that specific performance is a discretionary
remedy, the discretion of the Court is subject
to limitations. It is not an arbitrary or eapricious discretion, nor a personal one, but a sound,
judicial or legal discretion, controlled and regulated by established usages and principles of
equity; and relief is to be granted or denied
according to the circumstances of each particular case, on knowledge of the whole facts and
on full consideration of all the rights involved.
These established equitable principles are said to
be advisory rather than mandatory, the application of the rules and their exceptions to each
particular case being intrusted to the conscience
of the Qourt which must be guided by them.''
The following from Pomeroy's Equity, Third Edition, is in point:
''Section 860, page 1516. The second class of
cases embraces those in which parol evidence of
mistake is offered defensively. The equitable
remedy of the specific enforcement of contracts,
even when they are valid and binding at law,
is not a matter of course ; it is so completely
g·overned by equitable considerations that it is
sometimes, though improperly, called discretionary; it is never granted unless it is entirely
in accordance with equity and good conscience.
It is therefore ·a well-settled rule, that in suits
for the specific enforcement of agreements, even
when written, the defendant may by means of
parol evidence show that, through a mistake
of both or either of the parties, the· writing does
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not express the real agreement, or that the
agreetnent itself was entered into through a
mistake as to it::-~ subject n1atter or as to its
terms. In short, a court of equity will not grant
its affirn1ative remedy to compel the defendant
to perform a contract which he did not intend
to make or which he would not have entered
into had its true effect been under·stood. What
is thus true of mistake is equally true of a
defense based upon fraud or surprise. Wherever
the defendant's mistake was, either intentionally or not, induced, or m·ade probable or even
possible, by the acts of omissions of the plaintiff, then, on the plainest principles of justice,
such error prevents a specific enforcement of
the agreement. Such co-operation by the plaintiff, however, is not at all essential. A mistake
which is entirely the defendant's own, or that
of his agent, and for which the plaintiff is not
directly or indirectly responsible, may be proved
in defense, and may defeat a specific performance. This is indeed the very essence of the
equitable theory concerning the nature and
effect of mistake. A mistake thus set up by the .
defendant is not merely a ground of defense,
(but) of dismissing the suit.''
In a very recent case before the Supreme Court
of South Carolina, facts similar to those involved in this
case were before the Court for consideration. In the case
of Masonic Temple v. Ebert, 199 S. C. 5; 18 S. E. (2d),
584, the facts were so similar and the law so applicable
that defendant desires to quote at length from that case.
In that case, the plaintiff, through a real estate
agent, Baldwin, entered into a contract for the sale of
certain real property to the defendant. Baldwin, without
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the knowledge ol' the plaintiff, represented to the defendant that the rentals of the property were $3,680.00
per year, when in fact they were less than $2,000.00, and
represented that the taxes and insurance were $300.00,
when in fact they were over $700.00. The matter was
tried to a special referee, who concluded that the defendant had failed to avail himself of the means at hand to
ascertain the true facts and could not be heard to say
that he wa~ deceived by the misrepresentations of Baldwin. The Special Referee ruled in favor of the plaintiff
and the Circuit Court adopted the finding of the Referee.
The defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court on
two grounds, one of which was that it would he inequitable to decree specific performance in the matter. The
following are quotations from that case:
"It is well settled that specific performance is
not a matter of absolute right, but rests in
the sound discretion of the court, guided by
established principles, and is exercised by a consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case. A Court of Equity will not decree
specific performance unless the contract is fair,
just and equitable, nor if it fails to express the
true agreement of the parties by reason of
fraud, accident or mistake.
"At 58 C. J. 965 it is said 'As a general rule, if
defendant has been induced to make the contract by reason of any material misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff or hi's agent,
specific performance will be denied, whether the
misrepresentation was wilful and intended, or
made innocently or with an honest belief in its
truth * * * '
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"Equity may deny specific perfonnance because
of misrepresentations in procuring a contract,
when it would not rescind the agreement at the
in~tance of the injured party * * *
''It is ~tated in the case of G'asque v. Small, 21
S. C. Eq. 72, that: 'There is a material difference between a party who seeks to rescind and
one who seeks to enforce an agreement, as it
requires much stronger evidence to effect the
former, than will be sufficient to enable the
defendant to resist the latter.
"In laying great weight upon the failure of Ebert
to make a more complete investigation, we think
that the Special Referee and the Learned Circuit
Judge have a~plied the principles relating to
rescission of contracts, rather than those governing specific performance. It is true, however,
that Ebert is not seeking a rescission of a contract; he is defending an action for specific performance brought by the seller. Even if we
assume that if the defendant had sought a rescission of the contract, the court would have refused it, it does not necessarily follow that ,specific performance should be granted.
''It is not so much a question of diligence of Ebert
in investigating the representations, as it is a
proper application of the ancient maxim that
he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. For many years it has been held that the
Court of Equity will refuse to lend its aid to
one who has been guilty of inequitable conduct
in the subject matter. We think that this maxim
aptly fits the present case. The equitable status
of the plaintiffs is the primary consideration.
"We think that there were such misrepresentations on the part of the plaintiff, Baldwin, as
would make it inequitable for specific performance to be granted.
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"It is true that the false representations were not
made by the officers of the company or by Mr.
Wade ; they knew nothing of them. They were,
however, made by the company's selling agent
Baldwin, and it would not be equitable to allo~
the principal to have the advantage resulting
from such misrepresentations. * * *
One of the head notes reads : ''Generally if defendant has been induced to make a contract by
reason of material misrepresentations of the
plaintiff, or his agent, specific performance will
be denied whether the representation was wilful
and intended or made innocently or with honest
belief in its truth, and even though there existed
and were accessible to defendant the means and
opportunity of detecting the truth by ordinary
prudence, or although defendant had gone so
far as to make a partial investigation without
discovering the truth.''
Another rna tter which should appeal to the discretion
of the Court in this case is the fact that the respondent
and Mr. Woodard rescinded the contract. It is true that
no evidence was introduced to the effect that Mrs. Woodard rescinded the contract and the defendant confesses
that the law is that all parties to the contract Inust assent
to a rescission or abrogation. However, Mrs. Woodard
apparently had nothing to do with the transaction except
to sign a document or two. As a necessary allegation of
the plaintiffs' complaint, they allege that the plaintiff's
(both of them) were at all times ready, able and willing
to perform the contract. In. plaintiffs' brief they state
that the plaintiff, Mr. Woodard, testified that he and his
wife had always been ready and willing to perform the
operations required of them under the contract (page 14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
of appellant's brief). A reading of the transcript of evidence discloses that l\Ir. \Yoodard ,,~as speaking for himself and not for i\Ir::;. Woodard when he gave the evidence
set forth in Tr. 36 on this matter. It is noteworthy that
.Jlrs. Woodard did not take the stand, so that we have
no evidence as to whether or not :Mrs. Woodard consented
to the rescission by :Mr. Woodard. However, it may be
inferred that she knew that others were looking at the
property, and that efforts were being made to sell the
property to others after Mr. vVoodard had rescinded
and abandoned the contract.
Respondent submits that the decree rendered by the
trial court was amply supported by the evidence and was
in accordance with law. Respondent further submits
that the trial Court should have found in favor of the
respondent upon the matter of representations made by
the appellants' agent, Gagan, which were not true and on
that ground ruled in respondent's favor.
Respectfully submitted,

J. GRANT IVERSON,
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent.
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